美国近期提出了对中国紧急向债务缠身国家提供贷款做法的新担忧。他们认为这种缺乏透明度的资金流动可能会掩盖那些急需帮助、已转向中国寻求援助的脆弱经济所面临的财务困境。
美国财政部的一位高级官员Brent Neiman将在一次公开讲话中表达对此问题的关注,并呼吁国际货币基金组织(IMF)向中国施压,要求后者提供贷款条款的更清晰信息。这一问题在今年早些时候,拜登政府与中方官员在华盛顿举行的双边经济金融工作组会议期间直接讨论过。
中国的紧急贷款是通过其央行以所谓的掉期协议的方式进行的,允许国家借入人民币并保留中央储备中的这些资金,同时使用持有的美元偿还对外债务。
这种融资本质上是一条信贷线,国家将本国货币兑换成人民币,并同意支付给北京高额利率。这种方式让那些国家能够用美元储备来满足贸易和其他政府需求,甚至还能用于偿付中国银行的债务或从中国购买商品,从而进一步加深了其与中国经济的关系。
在过去的几年中,中国提供了超过2000亿美元的紧急融资。官方媒体近期报道指出,中国央行有31份价值约5860亿元人民币的有效掉期协议,总金额合计达到大约5860亿元。中国的货币贷款通常伴随着比美国联邦储备委员会或IMF提供更低贷款时更高的利率。
这种货币借贷并不总是体现在借款国的资产负债表上,这遮掩了其负债的真实规模。这样的信息缺失使得其他投资者难以准确了解国家的债务程度,并引发了对中国贷款可能使接收方陷入更不利境地的批评声音。
在华盛顿的官方货币和金融机构论坛的讲话中,Brent Neiman将指出由于中国的货币贷款不透明,国际货币基金组织在评估像老挝、苏里南和阿根廷等国家的财政健康状况时面临困难。
“这种混淆且不一致的处理方式部分反映了中国央行在每次swap安排细节上报告不足。”他引用了人民银行的说法。
不清楚中国央行对特定国家提供的资金数额、用途及其已偿还的款项,这给投资者以及国际货币基金组织在评估新融资或债务减免方案时带来了难度。
“我们应该继续培养官方部门投资支持IMF计划的热情并确保结果是透明、可信且符合预算的资金流动或债务减免扩展到实施改革的国家,而不是可能带来损害的形式。”Neiman将在三周后举行的年度华盛顿世界银行和国际货币基金组织会议上指出。
美国对中国通过一带一路倡议对贫困国家造成的过重债务多年以来一直批评不绝,并指责中国在汇率管理上施以补贴,同时支持国有及私营企业。这种做法被视为拜登政府采取对华强硬立场的信号之一。
在此背景下,中国的某些贷款还可能涉及向其国有银行已经借款的国家提供货币贷款,从而保护后者免于损失风险。
Brad Setser,国际关系理事会高级研究员建议中国应遵循其他主要中央银行的报告实践,这些央行同样提供货币掉期。他注意到这笔贷款缺乏透明度的问题引发了对债务方是否存在“隐藏债务”的疑问。
他认为中国央行在公开信息方面还不够透明。
新闻来源:www.nytimes.com
原文地址:U.S. Raises New Concerns Over Chinese Lending Practices
新闻日期:2024-10-01
原文摘要:
The United States is raising new concerns about China’s practice of making emergency loans to debt-ridden countries, warning that a lack of transparency surrounding such financing can mask the fiscal predicaments facing fragile economies that have turned to China for help. A senior Treasury official, Brent Neiman, will publicly air concerns about the practice on Tuesday during a speech in which he will urge the International Monetary Fund to push China for greater clarity about its lending terms. Earlier this year, the Biden administration broached the issue directly with Chinese officials in Washington during a meeting of a recently created bilateral economic and financial working group. Chinese loans to countries already struggling to repay their debts are being made through China’s central bank using so-called swap agreements. These agreements allow countries to borrow Chinese renminbi and keep those funds in their central reserves while using the U.S. dollars that they hold to repay foreign debts. The financing is essentially a line of credit, in which a country swaps its own currency for renminbi and agrees to pay Beijing a high interest rate. The arrangement allows those countries to use their dollar reserves to finance trade or other government needs. They can also use the funds to pay debts owed to Chinese banks or to make purchases from China, creating even deeper ties to its economy. China has provided more than $200 billion in emergency financing in recent years. Chinese state media reported this year that the central bank had 31 currency swap agreements in force worth a combined $586 billion. Chinese currency loans tend to come with higher interest rates than those offered by the Federal Reserve or the I.M.F. Such currency loans do not always appear on the balance sheet of the borrowing nation, obscuring the extent of its liabilities. That lack of information can make it harder for other investors to know how deeply in debt a country is and has fueled criticism that the Chinese loans could leave the recipients worse off. In a speech at the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum in Washington, Mr. Neiman will lay out how the I.M.F. has struggled to assess the fiscal health of countries such as Laos, Suriname and Argentina because of the murkiness of the Chinese currency loans. “This confusing and inconsistent treatment partly reflects a lack of reporting by the P.B.O.C. on the details of each of its swap arrangements,” Mr. Neiman will say, referring to the People’s Bank of China. A lack of clarity about how much money China’s central bank has lent to a country, what it can be used for and what has been repaid it makes it difficult for investors and the I.M.F. to make their own decisions about new financing or debt relief. “Collectively, we should continue to cultivate enthusiasm and secure commitments from the official sector to invest in support of Fund programs,” Mr. Neiman will say, three weeks before the I.M.F. and the World Bank plan to hold their annual meetings in Washington. “But we must make sure the result is the expansion of transparent, credible and on-budget financing flows or debt relief to countries undertaking reforms, not potentially damaging forms of lending.” For years, China has faced criticism from the United States and other Western nations that it saddled poor countries with excessive debt through its Belt and Road Initiative, which included nearly $1 trillion of construction lending. International policymakers have been pressuring China to restructure hundreds of billions of dollars of debt owed by poor countries that are facing defaults, but progress has been slow. Eswar Prasad, a former head of the I.M.F.’s China division, said the U.S. focus on Chinese currency lending reflected the Biden administration’s frustration with China’s management of its exchange rate and the subsidies it provided to both state-owned and private enterprises. “These are relevant in signaling the overall tough stance that the U.S. is taking against China on every issue, including economic ones,” Mr. Prasad said. In some cases, China has been extending currency loans to countries that owe money to its state-owned banks, protecting them from losses. Brad Setser, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, suggested that China should follow the same reporting practices of other major central banks that provide currency swaps. He noted that the opacity surrounding the accounting of the loans raised questions about whether countries that had already borrowed too much owed “hidden debt” to China. “I think the P.B.O.C. has not been very transparent,” Mr. Setser said.