当特朗普前任总统在 2018 年发起对中国的贸易战争时，美国实施了高达 25% 的关税，针对的是大约四分之三的中国进口商品，其目标有三个：一是削减贸易逆差，作为衡量经济成功的标准；二是将工作带回美国；三是迫使中国停止窃取美国知识产权。在所有这三个指标上，贸易战都失败了。
贸易战初见成效，导致与中国的贸易赤字有所缩小，但疫情爆发后反而增长，并且整体的贸易赤字也在增加。制造业就业岗位的增长在 2019 年暂停，随着更高的关税开始实施。美国贸易代表今年还抱怨称，中国企业在随意窃取美国的知识产权问题上依然无罪。
特朗普唯一能够宣称的优势是中国受贸易战打击比美国更大，因为它对国际贸易更加依赖。美国从中国的进口商品，特别是涉及加征关税的商品如半导体、家具等，明显减少；在中国生产这些关税商品的工业地区显示了经济放缓迹象。
这场贸易战真正的赢家是越南等国家，因为中国公司将生产转移到避免美国关税的地方，尤其是越南。在 2018 年至 2022 年期间，中国的对越投资增长了一倍左右，其向越南出口的商品总额增加到 1470 亿美元，根据咨询公司 Kearney 的数据。与此同时，同期从越南进入美国的美国进口商品几乎翻了三倍，达到 1360 亿美元。
中国将生产转移到像越南这样的国家作为贸易战失败的直接后果，仍然让美国依赖于中国。
如果下一届政府希望扭转这种不利局面，就需要重新考虑关税的设计方式，并且鼓励中国科技领袖在美设厂，而不是仅仅阻断来自中国的投资。这就如同上世纪80年代日本汽车制造商在美国设立工厂的方式。
虽然特朗普表示他想增加外国投资的吸引力，但他对来自中国的角色保持沉默，而是坚持他的老策略——计划对中国商品加征高达60%甚至更多、美国其他贸易伙伴的商品加征10%或20%的关税。这些数字可能会变化——特朗普经常抛出不同的数据，但目标非常明确：围绕美国经济建立一个“夹子”。
新的贸易战计划与之前的策略有着同样的缺陷：关税通常按照商品在最终组装地进口计算，不论其原产地如何，因此从中国拥有的越南工厂出口的商品被视为越南的出口。鉴于对中国的高税率会远高于其他任何国家，中国企业将有巨大的动机尝试将产品销售进入美国市场。
越南再次成为贸易战中受益者，因为它投资了支持出口经济的举措。但墨西哥很可能超越越南，因为它与美国有着自由贸易协定，这意味着它能成为零关税入口国。
中国公司显然正在做好准备。虽然中国在墨西哥的投资相对较小，但官方数据并未涵盖其增加的活动量。今年，中国电动车制造商比亚迪派遣代表团访问了墨西哥贾拉尔州，考虑在那里建立工厂，并会见了中国的供应商。 Lingong 机械集团则在美国新阿诺尔宁斯州建设了一个建筑设备生产厂，据传作为50亿美元投资计划的一部分。
美国政府官员以特朗普谈及其加征100%甚至更多关税在中国墨西哥组装的汽车出口到美国为例，说明他打算对中国进行打击，但这种战术不具可扩展性：追踪中国向美国出口价值超过4000亿美元商品的路径将是极其复杂的事情。
如果美国的目标是阻止中国的商品无论在何处生产，它需要更高级的方法。拜登政府称其采用了这一策略，通过对包括半导体、电池和电动汽车在内的高技术商品加征高关税，该概念已被哈里斯竞选团队认可。即便如此，民主党人与特朗普做法的关联性比他们所承认的更大，因为他们的政策并未废除特朗普对中国征收的任何关税。
减少依赖中国的更有效方式是将关税集中在高科技商品上，并且仅在非中国制造部件占高比例的情况下才免除关税，无论最终组装地在哪里。这是特朗普政府重修北美自由贸易协定时采取的做法：2018年通过谈判，为了获得零关税进入资格，一辆车的价值中有75%必须来自北美的生产。
拜登政府正在考虑不同的技术措施，如禁止中国车辆，尤其是如果它们收集的数据可以传至北京并被认定为国家安全风险的电动汽车。
美国更大的目标应该是与中国的商品竞争而不是仅仅阻止。这限制了美国企业的竞争力和创新动力，并损害了消费者的利益。在中国作为行业领导者领域如电动车、电池等行业的美国企业不应进行禁令，而是应该模仿中国的技术和生产方法。
美国也可以采取类似的做法。根据每个具体案例，鼓励中国企业在美国投资高科技领域，以先进科技为前提条件：聘用美籍工程师和科学家使用这些技术，并培训美国工人生产高科技商品。
这就是当前美国吸引来自韩国和台湾的半导体制造商在本土设厂并为其提供补贴、税收减免的方法之一。外国企业在本土制造高级芯片并训练美国工人。
当然，韩国公司与美国有军事盟友关系，而中国则是美国最大的竞争对手。华盛顿必须权衡成本（更依赖）与利益（获取领先技术）之间的得失，谨慎地审批中国投资，近来两国都在寻求经济脱钩。
但当一个国家主要依赖其他国家而非自身生产关键商品时，就存在风险。即使没有直接竞争，也不能忽视潜在的风险。例如，2018年贸易战揭示的是，在面对复杂的国际供应链和政治不确定性时，过度依赖单一经济体可能导致市场动荡和经济风险。此外，全球贸易体系中的多边合作与相互依存对于应对跨国挑战（如气候变化、公共健康危机等）至关重要。
因此，美国在考虑对中国的关税策略时，应该综合考量其长期利益和发展战略，寻求与合作伙伴之间建立更加平衡且可持续的经贸关系。在维持主权与保护自身经济利益的同时，通过增加合作与对话途径促进共赢和互相尊重的发展模式。
新闻来源：www.nytimes.com
原文地址：Opinion | Trump Lost the Trade War to China. America Needs a New Strategy.
新闻日期：2024-10-03
原文摘要：
When former President Donald Trump began his trade war with China in 2018, imposing tariffs as high as 25 percent on about three-quarters of all Chinese imports, he had three goals: Slash the trade deficit, which is his measure of economic success, bring back jobs to the United States and pressure China to stop ripping off U.S. intellectual property. On all those scores, the trade war flopped. Although the trade deficit with China initially shrank, it grew during the pandemic, as did the total trade deficit. A pickup in manufacturing jobs stalled in 2019 as higher tariffs kicked in. And the U.S. Trade Representative complained this year that Chinese firms continue to steal U.S. trade secrets “with impunity.” The best Mr. Trump could say is that China suffered more than the United States because it’s more dependent on trade. U.S. imports of Chinese semiconductors, furniture and other goods facing tariffs fell, and industrial areas in China making tariffed goods showed signs of a slowdown. The trade war’s only real winners were countries where Chinese firms shifted production to avoid U.S. levies, particularly Vietnam. Between 2018 and 2022, Chinese investment in Vietnam roughly doubled and its exports to Vietnam rose 75 percent, to $147 billion, according to the consulting firm Kearney. During that same period U.S. imports from Vietnam nearly tripled, to $136 billion, as Chinese firms used the country as a toll-free highway to the American market. This shift, which the economists Davin Chor and Laura Alfaro call the “great reallocation,” still leaves the United States dependent on China. If the next administration wants to buck this losing streak, it will have to rethink how it designs tariffs. And to deliver the greatest benefit to the U.S. economy it should move beyond the single-minded framework, embraced by both parties, of blocking investment from China and instead encourage the country’s technology leaders to set up operations in the United States, the way Japanese carmakers built American factories in the 1980s. While Mr. Trump has said he wants to boost foreign investment, he has been silent on a role for China. Instead he is doubling down on his old strategy, promising tariffs of 60 percent or more on China and 10 percent or 20 percent on the rest of U.S. trading partners. Those numbers may change — Mr. Trump regularly tosses out different figures — but his goal is clear: “a ring around the collar” of the U.S. economy. His new trade war plan has the same flaw as the old one: Tariffs are generally assessed on imports from countries where the goods are last assembled, no matter their origin, so goods that ship from Chinese-owned factories in, say, Vietnam are considered Vietnamese exports. And because tariffs on China would be set far higher than for any other country, Chinese firms would have a huge incentive to try this two-corner shot into the U.S. market. Vietnam would stand to win again from a second Trump trade war since it has invested heavily to support an export economy. But Mexico would probably be No. 1. It has a free-trade pact with the United States, meaning that it could become a zero-tariff port into the country. Chinese firms are clearly getting ready. While China is a relatively small investor in Mexico, the official data doesn’t capture the increased activity. This year, the Chinese electric vehicle maker BYD sent a delegation to the Mexican State of Jalisco, where it’s considering building a factory, and met with Chinese suppliers there. Lingong Machinery Group is building a construction equipment plant in Nuevo Leon, reportedly part of a $5 billion investment. Trump officials point to his talk of slapping tariffs of 100 percent or more on Chinese cars built in Mexico and shipped to the United States as an example of how he would crack down on China’s tariff evasion. But this tactic isn’t scalable: Tracking the pathway of the more than $400 billion in goods that China ships to the United States would be a nightmare. If America’s goal is to block Chinese goods — no matter where they are made — it needs a more sophisticated approach. The Biden administration says it’s taking one by applying new sky-high tariffs to only a handful of high-tech goods, such as semiconductors, batteries and electric vehicles, a concept the Harris campaign has endorsed. Even so, Democrats are closer to the Trump approach than they admit because they haven’t scrapped any of his China tariffs. A more effective way of reducing dependence on China would be to focus tariffs on high-tech goods, and to waive them only if a very high percentage of such a good is made with non-Chinese parts, regardless of where it was assembled. That’s the tack the Trump administration took when it renegotiated NAFTA in 2018: To qualify for zero-tariff entry now, 75 percent of a car’s value must be made in North America. The Biden administration is examining different techniques, such as barring Chinese vehicles, especially E.V.s if the data they produce could be transmitted to Beijing, which the administration frames as a national security risk. America’s larger goal, though, should be to outcompete Chinese goods, not merely to block them, which has a big downside: It reduces competition for U.S. firms and their incentive to innovate. That hurts U.S. consumers, who get lousier products, and makes U.S. exports less competitive. In industries where Chinese firms are technological leaders, such as E.V.s and batteries, the United States shouldn’t ban China but copy it. China advanced economically by wooing investment from leading U.S. and European firms, learning their technology and production techniques and incorporating them into Chinese-made products. The United States could do the same. On a case-by-case basis it should encourage Chinese firms to invest in high-tech fields in the United States, with the stipulation that they bring advanced technology, hire American engineers and scientists to use that technology, and train American workers to produce the high-tech goods. That’s essentially the strategy the United States is using now to persuade South Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor makers to build factories here, offering subsidies and tax breaks to foreign firms that will produce advanced chips domestically and train American workers. Of course, there is a difference between a firm from South Korea, a military ally, and one from China, America’s biggest rival. Washington would have to carefully weigh the costs (increased dependence) and benefits (access to leading-edge technology) before approving Chinese investment, which has plunged in recent years as Beijing and Washington sought to decouple their economies. But the United States makes a mistake when it aims mainly to bar Chinese investment and imports. As the first U.S.-China trade war shows, the strategy doesn’t work, except to enrich third countries. And it deprives the United States of Chinese expertise, often developed with a big helping hand from U.S. firms, that could now give America’s economy a boost.
