面对消费疲软、外界对华商品施压以及房地产市场基础仍然不稳的局面，中国领导层的目标是在今年实现约5%的增长率，这一目标颇为雄心勃勃。然而9月份的数据显示，目标滑落至难以触及的地步，政府随即出台了一系列刺激措施，包括降息等举措，意图扭转经济形势。
尽管如此，成功与否仍存不确定性。持续的通缩压力还引发了一场讨论：中国作为世界第二大经济体，在30年前所未有的增长后，是否正走向日本式的停滞状态？进入秋季之际，全球大部分银行预期中国经济将未及今年的增长目标。商品价格连续下跌，新屋价格自2014年以来首次走低；而消费者信心跌至过去一年多半的最低点。
政府继续依赖制造业和出口来推动经济复苏。在Bloomberg经济学家中，只有少于五分之一的人预测中国GDP将增长5%于2024年。一些银行家也对财政政策与货币政策未能有效提振内需表示疑惑。贸易领域依然充满风险：尽管出口量近两年来首次上升至近两年的峰值，但北京正面临来自担忧华国商品对全球市场影响的国家的压力。
日本式的停滞可能正在酝酿之中？中国工业的力量被一些高级官员提及，它被视为帮助世界对抗气候变化和控制通货膨胀的重要力量。世界上绝大多数的工作与生产都依赖于中国。据预测，到2028年时，中国将继续是全球经济增长的最大贡献者，其贡献率预计将达到22.6%，几乎是美国的两倍。
资源丰富的国家如巴西、澳大利亚等对中国的基础设施和房地产投资变化特别敏感。国内经济的下滑导致本地钢材供大于求，这推动了出口，并导致全球钢价下跌；钢铁企业因此深陷困境。中国疲软的需求也影响到Stellantis NV、阿斯顿马丁等品牌所在的汽车业，消费者变得更为节俭。
中国18万亿美元的经济体正面临着各个领域的困难。制造业采购经理人指数自2023年4月以来连续下降，在9月短暂反弹后又回落至收缩状态。美国切断华国先进技术供应的尝试正在加剧全球供应链的紧张，并引发外界对中国经济增长前景的新担忧。
信心在本土变得脆弱，中国银行向实体经济发放的贷款在今年夏天首次下降了19年来最多。地方财政压力剧增、土地销售收入大幅下滑，这使得政府难以增加经济所急需的财政支持。尽管新冠疫情限制措施于2022年末解除，并开放边境，国人消费反弹有望的现象并未如预期那般发生。
人们担心经济增长疲弱对就业和收入的影响，加之长达数年的房地产危机导致家庭财富缩水约18万亿美元，促使人们更倾向于储蓄而非消费，中国因此进入了自1999年以来最长的通缩周期。9月的黄金周假期期间，消费者支出略有回升，但这还远不能反映经济复苏迹象。
失业问题依旧突出，尤其是由于对大型科技公司的打压导致许多年轻、雄心勃勃的毕业生失去了高薪职业的可能。青年失业率连续两个月上升至今年新高。房地产自习近平主席在十年前提任以来一直是中国经济增长的关键驱动力之一。
为降低金融体系风险，政府曾在2020年试图减轻负债累累的开发商的压力。这一举措导致房价下跌，许多项目面临困境。众多开发商停工了已经售出但尚未交付的房子，并因此收到了房主的贷款拖欠。这种情况引发了中国民众对房地产视为财富存储工具的传统观念进行反思。
自2023年初开始的一连串下滑趋势继续在房产领域持续，直至今年5月，中国政府宣布推出迄今为止规模最大的计划以提振房地产市场。然而，中央银行提供的用于资助政府支持企业购买开发商剩余房产的4,300亿人民币计划进展缓慢；只有部分地方政府响应了这一政策呼吁。
过去对中国采取强硬措施时，中国政界高层似乎犹豫不决。但9月的一次政治局会议承诺将追求年度经济增长目标，并努力遏制房地产市场的下滑。当局已下调利率、释放流动性鼓励银行放贷，并承诺向股市投入3,400亿美元的资金以提振市场。当前政策举措的重点在于稳定房地产行业，包括降低现有抵押贷款利率和放松楼市限制。
最新一轮刺激计划预计可推动增长率达到2.5%的水平，未来四个季度GDP增速可能增加约0.2个百分点。尽管快速的刺激措施使得中国有望接近达到5%的增长目标，并在2025年开始呈现积极态势。但应对通缩并逆转对房地产市场的悲观情绪将是一项艰巨任务。这在很大程度上取决于政策制定者决定投入多少财政资源。
一系列贸易战正在威胁中国经济增长前景，而巨大的房产过剩意味着任何刺激措施都需要一段时间才能影响实际建筑活动。随着人口老龄化和城市化的放缓，推动住房需求的结构性因素越来越少；因此，中国可能面临一段持续的低增长期，就像日本在房地产和股市泡沫破灭后的“失落二十年”那样，在解决债务问题的同时，维持经济增长。
新闻来源：www.bloomberg.com
原文地址：Can China’s Stimulus Package Help Save Its Economy, Property Markets?
新闻日期：2024-10-03
原文摘要：
China’s leaders are aiming for economic growth of around 5% this year, an ambitous goal given sluggish consumer spending, against Chinese goods and a still shaky . In September, with the target sliding out of reach, Beijing unleashed a package of stimulus measures including interest rate cuts to turn things around. Success is not assured. Persistent deflationary pressures have also sparked a discussion about whether the world’s second-biggest economy is headed for a Japan-style malaise of stagnation after 30 years of unprecedented growth.As the calendar turned to autumn, the vast majority of global banks were expecting China’s economy to miss this year’s goal. Deflationary pressure was on the rise, with new-home prices since 2014 and consumer confidence at the in over a year and a half. The government continued to lean on manufacturing and exports to drive a recovery. Fewer than a fifth of economists Bloomberg were predicting gross domestic product would expand by 5% in 2024, as analysts at lenders such as Bank of America Corp. questioned why fiscal and monetary policy wasn’t doing more to revive domestic demand. Trade also remained a risk: While exports reached their in nearly two years, Beijing was facing a pushback from countries worried over the impact of cheap goods from the world’s biggest manufacturing nation. Top officials like Vice Finance Minister have China’s industrial prowess by saying it helps the world fight climate change and contain inflation. A lot of the world’s jobs and production depend on China. The China will remain the top contributor to global growth through 2028, with a share expected to represent 22.6% — double that of the US. Mineral-exporting such as Brazil and Australia are particularly sensitive to the ups and downs of Chinese infrastructure and property investment. For example, the domestic downturn left too much steel for the local economy to absorb, pushing up exports of the metal, which contributed to lower prices globally and plunged companies such as into distress. Weak demand in China is also hurting the bottom line of ranging from Stellantis NV to Aston Martin. Meanwhile, increasingly frugal consumers have sent diving for global brands like Starbucks Corp. and Estée Lauder Cos.China’s $18 trillion economy has been struggling across a range of sectors. , as of September, has been in contraction since April 2023, bar three months. Exacerbating the outlook are US efforts to cut China off from supplies of advanced semiconductors and other technologies set to drive future economic growth — an approach that officials in Washington call “strategic competition” and China decries as “.” Confidence at home became so fragile that China’s bank loans to the real economy this summer for the first time in 19 years. The balance sheets of cash-strapped local governments, which are already laden with , are among the casualties of slumping property prices. Their revenue from land sales has been declining at a , making it harder to reverse a drop in budget expenditure just when the economy is in dire need of fiscal support.Optimism was high as China exited pandemic curbs in late 2022 and reopened its borders that the nation would see a rapid recovery in consumer spending fueled by “,” eating out and travel. That boost failed to materialize as people fretted about what weak growth means for unemployment and incomes. The years-long real estate crisis also wiped out an estimated $18 trillion in wealth from households, prompting people to save rather than spend and pushing China into its longest streak of deflation since 1999. Chinese consumption slightly during a major holiday in September, adding to signs the rebound in spending by households still had a way to go. Unemployment remains a concern, made worse by a on big technology companies that deprived many young, ambitious graduates of a lucrative career path. The youth jobless rate rose in August for the second straight month to its this year.Real estate has been of China’s economic growth since President Xi Jinping came to office a decade ago. The government attempted to on heavily indebted developers in 2020 to reduce risks to the financial system. That pushed house prices down and many . Many developers stopped building homes they had already sold but hadn’t yet delivered, prompting some people to stop paying their mortgages. This turbulence was a wakeup call for many Chinese, who have long considered property a and used it as a store of wealth. The pain continued into 2024, extending a trend of declines in place since early 2022. In May, China unveiled its most far-reaching attempt to revive the property market. But progress has been slow on plans that include a program to provide 300 billion yuan ($43 billion) of central bank funding to help government-backed firms buy unsold homes from developers. And given the unattractive economics of the plan for local authorities, only a fraction of more than 200 cities urged to participate by the central government are heeding the call to help absorb an excess of housing. After long appearing reluctant to take more aggressive measures, the Politburo — consisting of the Communist Party’s most senior 24 officials including — vowed at a September meeting to pursue the annual economic goals and stop declines in the property market. Acting in coordination with the central bank, authorities have cut interest rates, unlocked liquidity to encourage bank lending and pledged up to $340 billion to boost China’s equities market. A major focus of the latest policy push is stabilizing the real estate sector, with measures such as a cut to outstanding mortgage rates and looser curbs in the housing market. The stimulus package may lift growth as much as over the next four quarters, according to Bloomberg Economics, which estimates this year’s boost at 20 basis points.The rapid-fire round of stimulus means China could come close to delivering that 5% growth goal and enter 2025 on an upbeat note. But overcoming deflation and reversing the gloom around property will be a tall order. It will depend in large part on the scale of fiscal resources that policymakers decide to commit. An escalating series of trade disputes has the to cut into growth. What’s more, massive oversupply of housing means it will take a while for any property stimulus to flow through to actual construction, if it does at all. With a and slowing urbanization, there are fewer structural factors driving housing demand. As a result, the country could face an extended period of weak growth while it works out its debt problems, just as Japan did in its so-called , after the property and stock market bubbles there burst.
