周五起，美国将对价值180亿美元的中国商品实施新关税措施，全球两大经济体之间的贸易紧张局势进一步升级。这些关税针对的是包括绿色技术如电动汽车、太阳能板和电池在内的14类中国产品。其中，北京为了摆脱经济放缓而优先发展的产业受到关注。然而，专家表示，实际影响有限，因为美国直接从中国进口的受影响商品数量相对较少。
具体而言，虽然涉及的总价值达到180亿美元，但情况各不相同。例如，美国几乎没有从中国进口电动汽车，主要原因是现有27.5%的关税现已上调至100%，这一因素基本不影响当前状况。同样地，美国对中国的钢铁和铝材进口量分别仅占其需求的小于1%和5%多一点。
然而，在锂电池领域情况不同。该类别中的大部分受影响商品价值约为130亿美元，约占总价值的72%。近年来，美国从中国进口用于电动汽车的锂离子电池的比例激增，达到2023年的70.5%，这反映出中国在全球电动汽车供应链中占据主导地位。同样，对于电动汽车至关重要的天然石墨等其他关键部件，美国对中国的进口量也在增加。
最近延期至2026年实施的针对来自全球最大生产国中国的25%天然石墨关税，则为美国寻找替代来源争取了更多时间。2023年，中美贸易逆差降至自2010年以来最低点，美国从中国进口的商品价值下降了20%，总额4272亿美元。这一降幅主要是由于前总统特朗普在任期间实施的关税政策以及现任总统拜登对大部分此类关税的维持甚至扩大。
最新的美国关税措施更为有针对性，不同于特朗普时期针对约3000亿美元中国商品广泛实施的关税。美国官员指责中国在电动汽车、太阳能板和锂电池等领域的“产能过剩”，认为这可能导致中国企业向海外市场大量出口低价产品，冲击本土竞争对手。中国方面否认存在过量产能问题，并称美方关税带有保护主义色彩，旨在阻碍中国经济发展。
北京辩称，通过限制对中国绿色技术的消费者访问，美国的限制措施将损害全球应对气候变化的努力。专家表示，两国的观点都有其合理性：“便宜的中国太阳能板和电动汽车确实可能夺走西方制造商的大量就业岗位。但与此同时，全世界都希望转向一个更绿色的世界。”
除了促进美国本土电动汽车和其他工业部门的发展，拜登政府希望鼓励美国盟友对中国商品实施各自的关税措施——例如，欧盟在6月对中国的电动汽车实施了此类措施。
这些关税可能会促使中国车企、太阳能板制造商及其他受到限制的行业进一步转移到不被征收关税的地方，比如东南亚和墨西哥。这也可能为马来西亚等其他国家提供新的低成本供应商机会，马来西亚是世界上最大的医疗手套生产商。这对美国来说可能并非坏事，因为当一家公司从中国迁移到其他国家时，“这也促进了韧性的供应链”，贸易咨询公司“繁荣美利坚联盟”（Coalition for a Prosperous America）的法律顾问Charles Benoit表示：“这样也能实现我们的政策目标。”
一些关税主要目的是为美国政府增加收入而不影响所需商品的进口，而高关税则更明确地旨在完全阻止某些产品的进口。Benoit认为，这些措施将显著减缓中国电动汽车在美国市场的发展速度，同时保持美国汽车制造商的竞争地位和专注于创新，尤其是在锂离子电池领域。
在谈到国际货币基金组织对这类贸易限制可能带来的扭曲交易、投资、碎片化供应链以及报复性举措的批评时，专家指出，虽然中国在过去存在一定程度的工业过剩产能，但不同行业的情况各不相同，并且一些最严重的问题已经过去。如今，“情况正在趋于稳定并逐步改善”。
新闻来源：www.nbcnews.com
原文地址：Biden’s new tariffs on Chinese goods are mostly symbolic. Here’s why.
新闻日期：2024-09-27
原文摘要：
New U.S. tariffs on $18 billion in Chinese goods take effect Friday as trade tensions intensify between the world’s two largest economies. The tariffs affect 14 categories of Chinese goods including green technology such as electric vehicles, solar panels and EV batteries — sectors that Beijing has prioritized as it tries to dig out from an economic slowdown. But experts say they are mostly symbolic since the U.S. imports relatively few of the affected products directly from China. For example, the U.S. imports almost no Chinese EVs, largely because of an existing 27.5% tariff that is now increasing to 100%. Similarly, the U.S. imports less than 1% of its steel from China and just over 5% of its aluminum. Lithium-ion batteries, however, are a different story, accounting for about $13 billion of the $18 billion in affected Chinese goods. The proportion of U.S. lithium-ion EV battery imports coming from China has surged in recent years, reaching 70.5% in 2023 as China continues to dominate the supply chain for a fundamental component of electric vehicles. Similarly, the U.S. has been increasing its Chinese imports of natural graphite, another crucial component of EVs. A 25% tariff on natural graphite from China, the world’s largest producer, has been delayed until 2026, allowing more time to find alternative sources. The U.S. trade deficit with China is at its lowest since 2010 as the U.S. imports fewer goods from China — $427.2 billion worth in 2023, down 20 percent from the year before. Experts say the decline has been driven largely by tariffs that former President Donald Trump imposed in office and that President Joe Biden has mostly maintained and in some cases expanded. The latest U.S. tariffs are more targeted compared with the Trump tariffs, which affected about $300 billion in Chinese goods, said Chim Lee, a senior analyst on China and Asia at the Economist Intelligence Unit. Biden administration officials have accused China of having industrial “overcapacity” in areas such as EVs, solar panels and lithium-ion batteries, which they worry could lead Chinese manufacturers to flood overseas markets with low-priced products that undercut domestic competitors. China denies that it has an overcapacity problem, saying the U.S. tariffs are protectionist in nature and designed to block the development of the Chinese economy. Beijing also argues that by blocking consumer access to affordable, quality Chinese green technology, the U.S. restrictions will hurt global efforts to fight climate change. “Both sides are correct,” Lee said. “Cheaper Chinese solars and cheaper Chinese EVs can actually take jobs away from a lot of manufacturers in, say, the West. But at the same time, the whole world is also interested in transitioning to a greener world.” In addition to promoting the development of U.S. EVs and other domestic industries, he said, the idea is to encourage U.S. allies to announce their own tariffs on Chinese goods — as the European Commission did for Chinese EVs in June. The tariffs may push Chinese automakers, solar panel manufacturers and others to further shift production to places that are not subject to them, such as Southeast Asia and Mexico, which last year surpassed China as the top source of U.S. imports. They could also create new opportunities for low-cost suppliers from other countries such as Malaysia, home to the world’s largest maker of medical gloves. That’s not necessarily a bad thing, said Charles Benoit, trade counsel for the Coalition for a Prosperous America. When a company moves production from China to another country, he said, “that’s also promoting resilient supply chains, which is also one of our policy goals. So I think that the tariffs will have an overwhelmingly positive impact.” While some of the tariffs serve mainly to generate U.S. government revenue without cutting off imports of needed products, the higher ones are designed more explicitly to shut out some products entirely. Benoit said the tariffs would significantly slow down the expansion of Chinese EVs in the U.S. while keeping American carmakers competitive and focused on innovation, particularly when it comes to lithium-ion batteries. “Absent the tariffs, it’s very hard to justify an investment in making those batteries here,” he said. The Biden tariffs have been criticized by the International Monetary Fund, which said such trade restrictions can distort trade and investment, fragment supply chains and provoke retaliatory measures. “Fragmentation of this type can be very costly for the global economy,” spokesperson Julie Kozack said in May after the tariffs were announced. In terms of retaliation, Lee said, Beijing has been “quite reserved” in its response to the tariffs as it tries to improve relations with the U.S. and other countries. “China today is not the same as China in 2018 and 2019, when there was a very clear tit-for-tat approach,” he said. Lee said that while there are signs of overcapacity in some Chinese industries, it is not equal across sectors and in some cases the worst of it has already passed. “Things are starting to stabilize, and it’s gradually going to improve,” he said.
