一次咬伤，两次警惕。最近，中国政府宣布的一系列高强度刺激措施并未让市场信心得以提振，这让不少投资者持观望态度。毕竟，自多个月前就承诺通过减息和特别贷款计划重振经济以来，政策效果似乎收效甚微。房地产市场持续低迷，生产商面临第三年的通缩困境，青年失业率再创新高。
每次有人问我这一轮刺激措施有何不同：这是否意味着中国政府已经到达了极限？又或者是因为经济状况如此糟糕，终于触及到了痛感点？当前，当FOMO（Fear of Missing Out）情绪抬头时，全球资产管理人士正激烈讨论着政府是否有意愿、能力以及财政空间来重振市场信心。作为外行，我不敢断言习近平的痛点所在——任何声称知道的人都在信口开河。但从最新政策的表态来看，高层终于意识到中国症结何在，并解释了过去措施为何未能起到效果。
几个关键点引起了我们的注意。首先，在财政领域，今年9月的中央政治局会议首次将“扩大财政支出”置于讨论中心舞台。这是自2018年以来的首次调整。中国政府正经历“第二波冲击”，地方财政作用有限，曾经通过推动区域增长、吸引企业入驻来提振经济的角色，如今因为房地产市场的下滑和土地销售收入锐减，反而成为了社会发展的绊脚石。
政府以罚款形式收取不合理费用以维持收支平衡。今年前8个月，非税收入增长了11.7%，而土地销售量却暴跌25.4%。如果基层公务员在收费问题上都显得如此任意和不合情理，人们又如何能对政府保持信心？
再者，青年失业率成为令政府头疼的问题之一。每年中国大学毕业人数超过1000万。据官方统计数据显示，8月青年人失业率达到惊人的18.8%，即便今年初统计局更改了数据计算方式，也难以掩饰这一高失业现象。政策发言的基调出现转变：5月份，习近平鼓励年轻人大胆迎接困难，并称这是他60年代的做法，结果被网民批评为缺乏实际意义。而今，政策语调有所变化，更加务实。
政府宣布将对毕业后两年仍未找到工作的毕业生提供支持措施。这背后反映着官方对Z世代面临的结构性劳动力市场问题的承认。为了转向新的增长引擎，如电动汽车制造业等产业方向，中国政府加大对房地产和金融服务领域的监管力度，从而限制了许多人的就业机会。尽管蓝领工作随处可见，但受过教育的城市青年是否愿意回到那些收入更高的职位上？
“高质量”就业已成为官方的新口号，这是一个不错的起点。
第三，在房地产市场方面，5月推出了多项措施，包括降低房贷利率、将未售出的房屋转化为公共住房等。作为这些计划的一部分，中国人民银行开通了3000亿元再贷款机制，允许国有企业从濒临破产的开发商手中购买公寓，并换取一定现金用于完成和交付预购房产。但这一政策实施至今效果不彰，因此，央行决定调整资金分配，将向金融机构提供100%本金支持，此前比例为60%，以求提振市场。
中国似乎正在效仿传统医学做法：若现有治疗方案无效，则适当调整药量并加大剂量。眼下无疑是中国经济下行压力下的关键节点。尽管对中国持悲观态度成为投资界的热门话题，资产管理人士也担忧政府的刺激措施不如以往那样奏效。然而，这次政策公告的不同之处在于，新口号显得更加贴近现实和市场情绪，并非一味强调旧理念。
未来，政策制定者们可能会迎来更多支持与认同。
新闻来源：www.bloomberg.com
原文地址：Xi Has Finally Realized What's Ailing China
新闻日期：2024-09-29
原文摘要：
Once bitten, twice shy. The supercharged stimulus measures China’s top leaders announced in recent days has left many investors unconvinced. After all, Beijing has been vowing to revive growth with rate cuts and special lending programs for months — to little avail. The property market is cooler than ever, producers’ deflation is entering a third year, and youth unemployment hit a record high again. Investors have been asking me how this round of stimulus is different: Is it the whatever-it-takes moment for China? Has the economy gotten so bad that it finally hit Beijing’s pain point? Now that FOMO, or fear of missing out, is kicking in, global asset managers are once again debating whether the government has the will, the competency, or the fiscal space to restore economic confidence. I am not one to say where President Xi Jinping’s pain point is — anyone who claims to know is bluffing — but looking at the latest policy announcements, it’s clear that top leaders have finally realized what is really ailing China, and why past measures have not worked.Three details jump out. First, the fiscal power. For the first time since 2018, the Politburo, headed by Xi, in September, topics usually reserved for the April, July and December meetings. Boosting fiscal spending took front seat in the readout. China is experiencing what Nomura Securities’ economist Lu Ting calls a “second wave of shocks.” In the past, local governments played a helping hand by promoting regional growth and luring businesses to relocate to their jurisdictions. But with the property downturn and dwindling revenue from land sales, they have become an impediment to society. They’ve been imposing exorbitant fines on things like traffic violations in order to make their own ends meet. In the first eight months of the year, non-tax revenue grew by 11.7%, while land sales tumbled by 25.4%. How can people have any confidence in the government if their first point of contact — often low-level civil servants — are arbitrary and unreasonable in their fee collections? In deep economic slowdowns, a government needs to fire on both fiscal and monetary cylinders. While the People's Bank of China has been cutting interest rates, the rest of the bureaucracy has been sitting idle — or even worse, annoying citizens and companies. The 2024 budget called for the government fund account, which includes spending on infrastructure projects, to hit a 4.9 trillion yuan deficit. As of August, the deficit was only 2.1 trillion yuan. The latest Politburo readout emphasized fiscal spending and borrowing, including the issuance and deployment of ultra-long sovereign as well as special-purpose municipal bonds. It’s a sign that Xi is now aware why PBOC’s monetary easing has not worked. Second, youth unemployment is perhaps as big a headache to the government as the property slump. China’s universities churn out more than 10 million graduates each year. The jobless rate for urban youth aged between 18 and 24 hit 18.8% in August even after the statistical bureau changed its data methodology in January, prettying up the numbers by excluding students from the labor pool. There’s a detectable shift in official rhetoric. Last May, Xi told young people to “” and embrace difficulties as he did in the 1960s, only to be mocked online. He changed his tone this year, instead. Last week, the government said it would to those who haven’t found a job two years after leaving universities. It’s a tacit acknowledgment of the structural labor market issues Gen Z are facing. In its bid to shift to new growth engines such as EV manufacturing, the government’s regulatory crackdowns on real estate and financial services have reduced employment options for many. There are plenty of blue-collar jobs out there, but do the educated urban youth want to go back to the or be , even if these gigs pay better? Providing “quality” jobs has become a new official slogan, which is a good start. Third, the property market. In May, China unveiled a , including lowering mortgage rates and converting some unsold homes into public housing. As part of that plan, the PBOC opened a 300 billion yuan re-lending facility so that state-owned entities can buy apartments from distressed developers, who in turn might get some cash to complete and deliver pre-sold flats to homebuyers. There has been little drawdown since. As a result, the central bank will , providing 100% of the principal, up from 60% previously. This is perhaps China embracing the essence of its traditional medicine: Tweak and double down the dosage if previous remedies fail to yield results. No doubt, being bearish about China is one of the most popular trades, and asset managers have been fretting that Beijing’s easing measures don’t work as well as before. However, this round of policy announcements is a bit different, in that the new slogans sound more informed and in sync with sentiments on the ground. The table is perhaps turning for technocrats. More From Bloomberg Opinion: Want more Bloomberg Opinion? . Or you can subscribe to .
