中华人民共和国成立75周年的日子即将来临之际，习近平主席将赞誉一个生机勃勃的国家，并展望在2049年建国百年时中国将成为繁荣无比的超级大国。然而，在广大民众的眼里，国家正踏入一个迥异的时间段——“历史的垃圾时间”。这个术语源于体育赛事中的情境，“垃圾时间”指的是当一场比赛胜负已定，双方开始演绎低质量比赛的状态。
在中国，这句话象征着一场艰难的转折点：经济的颓势导致了房地产市场崩溃与社会财富缩水。人们发现消费意愿降低，经济下行压力持续加大，甚至威胁到国家的整体稳定。这样的悲观情绪不仅仅由经济困境驱动。在深层次上，它也触及到了政治的根源。
中国历史上经历过更严重的经济挑战，但民众并未陷入绝望。上世纪90年代末期至本世纪初期，成千上万的国营企业被迫解散和裁员，当时社会也未见哀鸿遍野。普通民众仍然对国家未来保持乐观信念，这得益于他们相信当时的总理具有改革能力——他们理解政府需要采取果断行动来支持陷入技术困境的金融体系、重组无法盈利的国企，并在1997至1998年亚洲金融危机之后使经济更具竞争力。
然而，不同之处在于那些公民相信政府能够执行政策调整，尤其是在加入世界贸易组织后看到了新机遇。当2008至2009年的全球金融危机让西方经济陷入衰退时，中国政府迅速投入巨额银行信贷，使中国成为全球经济中为数不多的亮点之一。
如今，人们对政府决策表示不满，并且看到未来没有改善的可能。这并非基于对特定政策效果的怀疑，而是因为他们认为当前的领导层持续推行的是导致国内经济停滞不前和国际地缘政治紧张的相同政策。过去，中国共产党的权力结构允许了不同派系间的竞争，为政策的灵活性和转变留出了空间；没有哪一位领导人能够完全控制局面，使政权继续坚持明显不合时宜的策略。
而今，在习近平的带领下，国家正经历一个高度集权甚至个人化程度较高的领导模式。改变或逆转政策变得异常困难，甚至有时根本无法实现——这一点从中国经济近来陷入困境后未出现重大转向迹象可以看出。与此同时，与西方国家之间的紧张关系也降低了中国的前景，大多数中国民众并未预见与中国最重要的贸易伙伴恢复正常外交关系的时间点。
因此，“历史的垃圾时间”一词是对习近平持续统治的隐晦批评，暗示只要他仍然在位，这一状况便不会改变——正如体育比赛中的“垃圾时间”只有等裁判吹响终场哨才会结束。官方媒体和宣传机构对这一说法给予了强烈抵制。
但仅仅依靠审查与 censorship 并不足以恢复民众乐观的心态。首先降低与中国邻国及美国的关系紧张态势是最低限度的一步措施；实施真正意义上的经济改革，比如将资源从高端制造业转移至消费刺激领域，能有效提升国内信心。再者，习近平若能在最高决策机构中减少职位上的掌控（目前至少担任五个中央委员会和三个“领导小组”主席），则表明其愿意分享权力的态度。
虽然这些建议实现起来难度颇大，但似乎别无他路可走。建国75年之际，中华人民共和国已经超越苏联成为最长命的政治体制之一。回顾历史，苏联的崩溃并非偶然；在其1970年代中期，当苏联领导层拒绝进行必要的经济与政治改革时，该国便步入了“历史垃圾时间”。
中共自然不希望重蹈覆辙。要避免这一命运，习近平及其团队必须重新考虑战略规划。通过调整政策、降低与邻国的争端程度并加强与美国等关键贸易伙伴的关系，可以为国家未来的稳定和发展铺平道路。
最终，无论是采取何种方式，只有让民众看到未来更加光明的发展前景和充满希望的可能性，才能真正唤醒他们对未来的期待，并激发改革的动力。
新闻来源：www.bloomberg.com
原文地址：Has China's Economy Entered the 'Garbage Time' of History?
新闻日期：2024-09-22
原文摘要：
It is hard to recall a more striking disconnect between the Chinese people and their modern leaders. When President Xi Jinping marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China on Oct. 1, he will hail a thriving nation destined to become a prosperous superpower by its centennial in 2049. Ordinary Chinese, on the other hand, see their country entering quite a different period, captured in a recently coined — “the garbage time of history.”In sports, “” refers to that point in a game in which one team trails so badly that defeat is no longer in doubt. The remainder of the contest is filled with pointless, low-quality play.Many in China are convinced their country is trapped in a similarly futile dead end, its prospects unlikely to brighten as long as its remains unchanged.On the surface, such pessimism is driven by economic woes. The collapse of the real estate sector has shrunk the net worth of the . The resulting negative wealth effect has curbed exacerbating the slump and threatening .The malaise, however, has deeper political roots. The country has gone through much worse economic times before without despairing. Tens of thousands of state-owned enterprises were liquidated and more than workers laid off at the end of the 1990s. Still, ordinary Chinese remained optimistic about the future.The difference is that those citizens believed in the competence of the reformist then-premier . They accepted that the government needed to take decisive action to shore up China’s technically insolvent banking system, restructure its unprofitable state-owned enterprises, and make the economy more competitive in the wake of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. And they could look forward to China joining the World Trade Organization.Such faith in the country’s leadership was redeemed again when the 2008-09 financial crisis plunged Western economies into recession. The government pumped bank credit equal to into the economy within a year and made China one of the few bright spots globally.Now, Chinese are not only dissatisfied with government decisions. More importantly, they see no possibility of improvement because the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party has repeatedly signaled that it intends to maintain the same domestic and foreign policies that have led to economic stagnation at home and geopolitical tensions abroad. In the past, collective leadership and competition for power among rival factions created some space for policy flexibility and reversals. No single leader was powerful enough to force the regime to stick to demonstrably counterproductive policies.Under Xi, the party is ruled by a highly centralized, if not personalized, leadership. Changing or reversing policies is extremely hard, if not impossible, as evidenced by the absence of major shifts since China’s recent economic struggles began in mid-2023.Moreover, geopolitical tensions with the West have diminished the country’s prospects, and most Chinese people simply do not see when and how relations with their most important trading partners will return to normal.The phrase “garbage time of history” thus is a thinly veiled dig at Xi’s open-ended rule, implying that this sorry state of affairs will not change as long as he stays in power. (In sports, “garbage time” ends only when the clock runs out.)Not surprisingly, official media and propagandists have strongly the phrase. Restoring a sense of optimism will require something more than censorship, however.Lowering tensions with China’s neighbors and the US is a minimum first step. Implementing real economic reforms — for example, diverting resources from high-end manufacturing to stimulating consumption — would boost sentiment. If Xi relinquished some of his positions in top decision-making bodies (he currently chairs at least five central commissions and three “leading groups”), he would signal a willingness to share power.As unlikely as those options may seem, the alternative path will not be pretty. At 75 years old, the PRC has already beaten the longevity record of the Soviet Union by one year. In retrospect, the fall of the Soviet regime was no accident. It entered its own “garbage time of history” in the mid-1970s when Soviet leaders refused to adopt much-needed economic and political reforms.The CCP surely doesn’t want to meet the same fate. To avoid it, Xi and the party will have to rethink their game plan. More From Bloomberg Opinion: Want more Bloomberg Opinion? . Or you can subscribe to .
